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Alter-Europeanism? The left and European 
integration after the crisis
Michael Holmes and Knut Roder
A confluence of crises in a difficult decade
A crisis is a time of intense difficulty or danger, usually associated with a 
clear choice between alternatives. It involves three features: an event that 
occurs at a specific moment in time, a serious challenge to established 
norms, and the opportunity for a transformative moment. The economic 
crisis that erupted in 2008 proved to be a ‘dangerous opportunity’ for left-
wing parties, whether social democrats, the green left, or the radical left. 
Initially, it seemed to offer new political and economic opportunities for 
the left.
The first of these is the economic crisis itself. The events that began in 
2008 certainly fit the criteria outlined above: there was a clear trigger moment 
– the autumn of 2008, when several banks collapsed and others needed 
rescue; there was a clear systemic challenge – to economies, to societies, to 
polities; and there was the possibility of economic, social and political 
transformation. As explained in Chapter 1, the economic crisis itself includes 
at least four elements. The banking collapse of 2008 led to a sovereign debt 
crisis after governments intervened to try to prop up their banking systems. 
This in turn contributed to the very specific Eurozone crisis that developed 
due to the constraints of EMU, and these three financial and economic 
factors in turn caused a widespread social and political crisis.
The second overarching crisis is that of European integration. One analysis 
identified at least 13 different areas where the EU integration process has 
been challenged by ‘separate though related crises’ that are ‘multi-faceted 
in their sources, characteristics, and consequences’ (Dinan et al., 2017: xx). 
Apart from the economic recession and the attendant Eurozone crisis, the 
EU has also had to respond to crises in areas such as migration policy and 
foreign policy. Indeed, these contributed to an overall legitimacy crisis of 
the Union, particularly towards the end of this ‘difficult decade’ when Britain 
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voted to leave the EU and parties on the right within various EU member 
states were electorally successful on anti-EU integration platforms.
The third crisis is that of the left. The idea that ‘social democracy is in 
crisis’ is widespread (Keating & McCrone, 2015: 1; see also Callaghan et 
al., 2009; Hickson, 2016). In a wider left context, Sassoon argues that 
left-wing parties face an ‘agonising dilemma’ (1997: 12) between defending 
welfare gains and responding to globalisation. This crisis is evident both 
in an ongoing electoral decline and a search for a new programmatic vision. 
This predates the economic crisis, with Anderson identifying in the 1990s 
‘a wider moral crisis in the identity of the major organizations of the West 
European left’ (1994: 2). But the economic crisis certainly impacted on the 
left, with former British Labour Party minister Peter Hain asking bluntly, 
‘why have social democratic parties been in abject retreat?’ (2016: v).
One common explanatory factor could be globalisation. Mitchell and 
Fazi argue that the decline of the left is not just electoral, it reflects a change 
of core values within society. For them, ‘the extreme right have been more 
effective than left-wing or progressive forces at tapping into the legitimate 
grievances of the masses – disenfranchised, marginalised, impoverished and 
dispossessed by the 40-year long neoliberal class war waged from above’ 
(Mitchell & Fazi, 2017: 3). The right has been better able to ‘provide a 
(more or less) coherent response to the widespread – and growing – yearning 
for greater territorial or national sovereignty, increasingly seen as the only 
way, in the absence of effective supranational mechanisms of representation, 
to regain some degree of collective control over politics and society, and in 
particular over the flows of capital, trade and people that constitute the 
essence of neoliberal globalisation’ (Mitchell & Fazi, 2017: 3).
This book has analysed the confluence of these three crises, and has 
sought to explain how the economic crisis and the European crisis contributed 
to the crisis of the left. The analyses have touched on the political challenge 
of globalisation in Europe and the rise of the right. This concluding chapter 
argues that the conventional interpretations of the relationship between the 
left and European integration have been altered by the crises. We start by 
summarising the existing interpretations of the left and integration, before 
setting out the argument that the crises created an opportunity for a new 
left perspective on the European Union, which we term ‘alter-Europeanism’. 
We then analyse the main obstacles baulking the achievement of any new 
form of programme for the European left in the context of the current form 
of European integration.
Judging from the case studies in this book, the European left remains 
broadly supportive of EU integration and is reluctant to embrace Euroscepti-
cism fully. Arguments for any form of ‘Lexit’ (Guinan & Hanna, 2017) – 
withdrawal from the EU specifically to pursue a left-wing agenda – are an 
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exception. However, extensive debates have emerged over the direction of 
the European Union, indicating that there are limits to the Europeanisation 
of the left. The economic crisis has significantly altered the relationship of 
the left and Europe.
Interpreting the left and European integration
The analysis of the impact of European integration on political parties has 
generally revolved around two dimensions. The first dimension focuses on 
the impact on individual parties, with arguments ranging from Euroscepticism 
to ones saying that parties are becoming more pro-European. The second 
dimension is more about the impact on party systems than on individual 
parties, and debates whether or not a single European polity is developing. 
Both of these dimensions have an impact on parties of the left.
The Eurosceptic line of argument stresses that the left has always been 
wary of the market principles that underpin European integration. Many 
social democratic parties were cautious about integration at the outset, 
as Newman (1983) and Featherstone (1988) point out. Indeed, some were 
downright hostile to it, notably the British Labour Party and Greece’s PASOK, 
which did not warm to the idea until the 1990s at the earliest. And this 
tendency was even more pronounced among green left parties and radical 
left parties. Bomberg comments that ‘the EU represents much that greens 
instinctively oppose’ (1998: 3), while March notes that among radical left 
parties, ‘opposition to the “really existing” EU has proven a consolidating 
factor’ (2012: 202). Their view often reflects disappointment at the perceived 
failure of the EU to deliver on its promise of a ‘social Europe’ (Attac, 2017: 80).
The alternative perspective to Euroscepticism emphasises the Europeanisa-
tion of the left. Ladrech (2002) and Poguntke et al. (2007) argue that the 
Europeanisation of political parties involves a subtle pressure on parties to 
adapt policies, strategies and structures to enable them to deal more effectively 
with the EU. This does not necessarily imply pressure towards a more 
pro-European position, but in the case of social democratic parties there is 
plenty of evidence of such a shift (see inter alia Featherstone, 1988; Ladrech 
& Marlière, 1999; Lightfoot, 2005). Even among the green left and radical 
left, there are suggestions that some see the EU as essentially a flawed but 
progressive project. Bomberg notes that ‘for many green actors, participation 
in the EU is attractive if not imperative’ (1998: 3), while March accepts that 
several radical left parties ‘are increasingly integrationist’ (2012: 203).
In overall terms, the Europeanisation thesis works especially effectively 
in explaining the position of the social democratic left. From the very outset 
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of the integration process there has been an apparently inexorable move 
among members of this party family to a more pro-EU stance. It is evident 
too among green left parties, although here the centripetal force has been 
less strong. The Europeanisation of the left is least evident among radical 
left parties, but even here the pattern had been visible, as we argued in our 
previous analysis (Holmes & Roder, 2012; see also Holmes & Lightfoot, 
2016). This is at least partly because of a strong rhetorical commitment to 
internationalism that exists on the left. Left-wing parties of all types are 
very supportive of the principle of international cooperation, and that creates 
a prima facie case for them to support European integration.
The relationship between left-wing parties and integration was 
changed by the economic crisis. The seemingly inexorable drift towards 
Europeanisation was halted and in some cases reversed. But this does 
not necessarily mean that the left became more Eurosceptic. Instead, the 
crisis highlighted the vulnerability of individual states in the face of global 
financial forces. So while left parties could see many reasons to leaven 
their enthusiasm for the EU, they were also sharply aware that some form 
of European integration could be a valuable safeguard for social rights and 
freedoms.
Finally, we return briefly to the second dimension of the impact of integra-
tion on party systems. Some analysts argue that the EU represents an evolving 
party political system, different from national systems and still under-
developed, but nonetheless distinctly a party political system (see for example 
Hix & Lord, 1997). Others contend that the EU has not fundamentally 
changed party system structures, and that ‘party systems appear to remain 
relatively impervious to the direct impact of Europeanization’ (Mair, 2000: 
47). No single EU polity has developed, and instead party politics in the 
EU remains steadfastly national in its orientation.
In this conclusion, we will argue that the crisis constituted an EU-wide 
political shock, though the responses to it are still not wholly Europeanised. 
But rather than having 28 separate national reactions, the analyses in this 
book suggest the emergence of regional political systems within the larger 
EU. And while Mair’s argument does have validity, the crisis led left groups 
in the European Parliament to call for an alternative form of certain aspects 
of the Europeanisation process – most notably relating to EMU and the 
single currency. GUE/NGL published a series of ‘economic discussion 
documents on the future of the Eurozone’ (Clancy, 2017), the social democrats 
suggested the ‘completion and rebalancing of economic and monetary union 
as a democratic call out of the crisis’ (Socialists & Democrats, 2015) and 
the Greens called for agreed roadmaps to ‘put the EMU on a sustainable 
footing’ (Greens-EFA, 2016).
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Impact of the crisis
The economic crisis is a strange case of simultaneous left harmony and left 
disunity. When the banking crisis first erupted, there was a clear and consistent 
analysis shared across the left. They argued that the essential cause of the 
crisis was a failure of the private sector. The banks had become too greedy 
and too focused on short-term profit maximisation rather than long-term 
development. In addition, there was also recognition of a degree of govern-
mental culpability, for allowing too much deregulation and failing to keep 
the banks in check. This was not a rejection of the role of governments in 
general, rather it was seen as governments having become too complicit in 
right-wing policies.
This view was by no means out of line with mainstream analysis of the 
crisis. For example, the Levin-Coburn report (US Senate, 2011) concluded 
that the crisis was the result of failures of both the market and the regulatory 
system, which had allowed the emergence of very high-risk and complex 
financial products. In similar vein, the commission established under Barack 
Obama’s presidency highlighted excessively risky borrowing and investments 
in the financial services sector, excessive deregulation, and a ‘systemic 
breakdown in accountability and ethics’ (FCIC, 2011).
However, the common left analysis led to two different interpretations 
about how to respond. The social democratic approach was that the economic 
system had been allowed to get out of control, but it could be reined in. 
What was needed was a return to greater regulation and supervision, greater 
management of the economy, and a shift away from a corporate culture of 
excess towards one of long-term sustainability. Essentially, the system had 
been allowed to run loose; it needed tighter control, but there was nothing 
fundamentally wrong with the system. In contrast, radical left parties put 
forward a much more succinct interpretation. Rather than see it as an 
aberration, the crisis was better understood as evidence of a systemic failure 
of capitalism, and rather than trying to repair the system the aim should 
be to replace a broken model.
However, when it came to practical policy responses to the crisis the 
ideological distinctions on the left were reduced. The social democrats, the 
green left and the radical left all argued for greater regulation of the financial 
services sector. They also advocated that the response to the economic 
recession should involve investment rather than austerity. Indeed, the chapter 
by Cláudia Toriz Ramos highlights how opposition to austerity was the 
strongest binding agent when the social democrats, the radical left, the 
communists and the greens were putting together a framework for government 
in Portugal. Tapio Raunio’s chapter shows a similar case in Finland when 
the radical left went into government there.
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The problem was how to achieve these things. The first barrier to 
overcome was to get into government, but across Europe, right-wing 
parties dominated both before and after the onset of the crisis. Indeed, as 
we noted in Chapter 1, several analyses have pointed out that economic 
depressions generally tend to favour the right more than the left (Gamble, 
2009: 109–110). Nor were social democratic parties in a strong position to 
challenge the economic orthodoxy being propounded by the right, since they 
had only relatively recently embraced those policy programmes themselves. 
Even though those policies were now being questioned, it was hard for 
social democratic parties to convince voters that their re-conversion was 
sincere.
This was also because when social democratic parties did have a chance 
of getting into government after the onset of the crisis, it was often as a 
junior partner in a coalition with the right. That meant the social democrats 
were implementing austerity and cuts, not reversing them. This is evident 
in Ireland, where the Labour Party came to power in 2011 on promises of 
renegotiating the strict bailout constraints, only to accept them once in 
office. The same could be said of the SPD in Germany, which accepted 
restrictive policies as part of its grand coalition agreement with the CDU-CSU. 
And while the radical left only rarely tasted government in this period, it 
could even be applied to SYRIZA in Greece and AKEL in Cyprus, which 
came to power promising to challenge the diktats of Brussels, only to end 
up acceding to those demands.
The implication would seem to be that EU constraints made it extremely 
hard for left parties to pursue any different policy programme when in 
government. There are some suggestions that the geringonça government 
succeeded in steering Portugal away from stringent austerity, but apart from 
that, most have accepted – and rather meekly, at that – the parameters set 
down by the EU and the ECB.
Thus, one overall feature is the collapse of the traditional social democratic 
vote in several countries. It is particularly noticeable in some of the bailout 
countries. In Greece, Spain and Ireland (and in Italy, which did not actually 
receive a bailout but which went through a very similar socio-economic 
and political crisis), the main social democratic parties suffered significant 
losses. But it is evident elsewhere too. The traditional social democratic 
parties suffered bad reversals in France and in the Netherlands, while in 
Germany and Austria, a steady decline has persisted. In eastern Europe, 
the social democratic left suffered badly in Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. Some even refer to social democratic parties becoming ‘pasokified’, 
in other words ‘reduced to parliamentary insignificance, or at least largely 
removed from the ability to achieve electoral majorities on the national 
level’ (Mitchell & Fazi, 2017: 2).
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In some cases, the vote has gone to the radical left, suggesting that left-wing 
voters have become disillusioned with the compromises of government. 
Again, this is especially noticeable in some of the bailout countries, with 
the rise of SYRIZA in Greece, of Podemos in Spain, of Sinn Féin and other 
smaller parties in Ireland, and of the contribution to an alternative government 
on the part of radical left parties in Portugal. But the radical left is not 
widespread. In 12 EU member states, there was no radical left party in 
parliament at any time during the crisis. They are a particularly rare creature 
in eastern European countries.
In overall terms, the economic crisis highlighted the persistent absence 
of a single European polity. However, the analyses in this book indicate 
that the crisis had an immense impact on the EU member states’ party 
political systems. There was no single consistent pattern across the EU, due 
to different historical contexts and national circumstances. But there is 
evidence of a three-way split in the European Union. The crisis contributed 
to the development of what could be termed ‘regional political systems’ in 
the EU. Our analysis suggests the emergence of three such ‘regional systems’. 
We can refer to them using geographical labels, though this is perhaps 
slightly misleading.
There is a group composed predominantly of southern European states, 
though there is a case to be made for Ireland to be seen as an ‘honorary’ 
southern state. These have often been referred to as the ‘PIGS’ (Dainotto, 
2007: 2) and are characterised by historical under-development compared 
to other EU states, with some rapid growth prior to the crisis, but with 
particularly sharp crises that resulted in bailouts and severe austerity 
programmes. The second group is one made up of northern European states 
characterised by more developed economies and generally by creditor status 
in the debt crisis. The third group is that of eastern European member 
states, which have gone through a recent post-communist economic and 
political transformation.
If there is a positive ‘left effect’ of the crisis, it is in the ‘southern’ region. 
All of these countries were marked by extensive public protest against 
austerity. This translated into party politics in slightly different ways, but 
generally, social democratic parties did badly, either straight away or after 
a period in government. It also meant the rise of radical left parties in some 
of these countries, particularly in Greece, Spain and Ireland, but also to 
some degree in Portugal. The picture in Italy is less clear. A traditionally 
strong radical left was marginalised during the crisis, but a new populist 
party emerged, the Five Star Movement, which mixed some left-wing policies 
with a more conventional right-wing agenda.
The ‘northern’ group includes many traditional social democratic strong-
holds, such as Germany, the Netherlands and the Nordic states. Here, the 
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impact of the economic crisis was more about limiting austerity rather than 
opposing it, and there was little evidence of any sense of European solidarity 
with struggling states. Attitudes to Greece were a litmus test of this, and as 
Ehl notes laconically, ‘helping Greece is a synonym for trouble’ (2015). Social 
democratic parties at best held static, and at worst suffered serious defeats, 
as in Germany and the Netherlands in 2017. The green left and radical 
left also did not benefit significantly in any of these countries. There were 
occasional successes, such as the surge to the Green Left in the Netherlands 
in 2017, but also setbacks, such as for the Austrian Greens that same year.
Finally, the European left is weakest in the ‘eastern’ group of states. 
Indeed, the chapter on Latvia by Karlis Bukovskis and Ilvija Bruge highlights 
how the term ‘left’ remains electorally toxic. The analysis in this volume 
has not looked extensively at these states, partly because few of them have 
adopted the euro (one of our selection criteria) and partly because the left 
was already weak in these states before the crisis. Green parties in these 
states tend to be right- rather than left-leaning, while radical left parties 
are hardly evident at all in eastern Europe. Social democrats were more 
prominent, but even here several well-established parties suffered bad defeats 
during the years of the economic crisis. Notably, the Hungarian MSZP 
collapsed from over 43% of the vote in 2006 to less than 12% in 2018, the 
Czech ČSSD went from over 32% in 2006 to 7.3% in 2017, and left parties 
failed to win any seats in the 2015 election in Poland. These results are not 
specifically to do with the crisis, but they do link to a growing mood of 
Euroscepticism in many of these countries.
In overall terms, the crisis created a political opening, but the left was 
unable to seize that opportunity in Europe. Social democratic parties 
continued their slow decline, and in some cases, this was accelerated. Green 
left and radical left parties had pockets of success, but generally remained 
marginal to politics in most EU countries. The dominant reason for the 
failure of the left lies in their approach to the European Union itself, and 
as we argue in the next section, this remains a major stumbling block for 
the development of a coherent alternative to current notions of European 
integration.
Alter-Europeanism
While the European Union could not be accused of triggering the initial 
financial crash, it was a central player in the evolution of the crisis in 
Europe, particularly with the sovereign debt crisis. This brought to the 
fore the relationship of the left with the EU. The left responded to the 
developing crisis with mounting criticism, although this varied in intensity 
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both according to party ideology and to national setting. But very few 
left parties actually moved towards a Eurosceptic position. Instead, the 
speeches and statements and comments across the left are replete with calls 
for ‘another Europe’, a ‘different Europe’, a ‘better Europe’. Adopting the 
idea of alter-mondialisme from the French left,1 there is a clear commitment 
to the idea of alter-Europeanism.
Alter-Europeanism implies both support for European integration and a 
commitment to changing the path of integration in a more progressive, 
leftist direction. The core analysis of alter-Europeanism is that the EU is 
here to stay but that it must be reformed. Indeed, the analysis argues that 
the crisis was caused by globalisation, and that the EU is the only possible 
bulwark against that globalisation. The individual states are simply too 
small to be able to deal with the might of global capital on their own, and 
they need the collective strength of the Union to respond effectively.
However, there is also an acceptance that the EU as presently constituted 
is flawed, in two main ways. First, there is general acceptance on the left 
that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit, and that it needs institutional 
reform to make it more open and accountable. Second, there is broad agree-
ment that the EU is biased towards business interests at the expense of the 
broader public. For some, this involves a demand for a return to a European 
social model; for others, it means a more trenchant critique of a neoliberal 
Europe. Overall, the crisis has strengthened the idea that there needs to be 
a distinct left vision of a new policy direction for European integration and 
a more democratic institutional architecture for the EU.
The problem is that the commitment to alter-Europeanism lacks any real 
substance. There is no agreed agenda, no agreed platform, and this goes 
right across the spectrum of the left. Even before the economic crisis, Unger 
stated ‘the left is missing an alternative’ (Unger, 2005: 12). More recent 
arguments suggest that ‘despite a crisis of neoliberalism, no clear and viable 
social democratic alternative appears to have (thus far) been forthcoming’ 
(Bailey et al., 2014: 2), and that ‘the failure of the centre left to set the 
political agenda in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis was notable’ (Bick-
erton, 2018). Similar analyses exist further to the left. Gabriele Zimmer, 
chair of GUE/NGL, accepts that ‘left-wing progressive forces have faced a 
complete absence of a common vision for Europe’ (2018), while March notes 
that ‘attitudes to the EU are still too divided for a clear vision of “another 
Europe” to evolve’ among the radical left (2012: 203).
Why is there no consensus? The first problem lies in the nature of the 
political system of the EU. The power structure in the Union reflects deeply 
embedded policies and practices that are very difficult to alter. There is a 
‘treaty fatigue’, with governments having little appetite for the long 
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negotiations required to amend existing treaties or introduce new ones. The 
various agreements reached by EU governments during the crisis, such as 
the Fiscal Compact Treaty, were inter-governmental ones that sidelined 
even the weak supervisory procedures at the EU level. Furthermore, the EU 
political system acts against the development of alternative programmes. It 
has no space for a ‘loyal opposition’: if you are in government, you have a 
say; if you are not, you have virtually no voice. Even the EP is muted because 
its dominant approach is to aim for a pro-integration consensus.
The second problem lies in the often fractious relationships on the left. 
The parties of the left are political competitors, and the European Union 
has become a means of differentiating themselves from each other. This 
competition inevitably makes it harder to find common ground. While there 
might be broad agreement about the need to reform the EU, it comes from 
quite distinct standpoints and leads to different approaches. There is no 
shared left vision of what integration should be about. This is reflected in 
Gabriele Zimmer’s appeal that ‘instead of tearing ourselves apart over the 
degree to which the EU is a neoliberal project, something we mostly agree 
on, we should ask ourselves if we have a vision of what our Europe should 
look like’ (Zimmer, 2018).
This does not just apply to relations between different left-wing parties, 
it is also evident within parties. Within the social democratic family, there 
are increasing calls for parties to realise not just the importance of cooperating 
and developing common programmes and campaigns, but that they should 
reform their cross-national communication structure by using the PES to 
enhance the ability to solve problems and take common policy decisions 
(Nehmitz, 2017). But judging from the case study contributions to this 
project, the long-term political process of the left debating, never mind 
agreeing, on a future vision of the EU integration process that distinguishes 
itself significantly from the direction of previous decades has only started 
and, lessons learned, needs to become far more coordinated and potent.
In fairness, to link ideas into an attractive and coherent programme of 
societal change is a difficult task. It is not made any easier in a political 
context where majorities are difficult to achieve, while EU treaties and other 
international agreements rule out any radical action, and where the threats 
of severe market and banking responses deter the implementation of radically 
different policy agendas. Understandably, most of the electorate were reluctant 
to risk economic meltdown and political instability, even in the depths of 
the crisis.
But this creates a third problem. Parties of the left are not the only ones 
reacting to the EU and the pressures of globalisation, and other parties 
found it easier to commandeer the terrain. The centre right was best placed 
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to promote an agenda emphasising stability and a return to an assumed 
‘normal’, while the populist right could exploit people’s fears when faced 
with economic hardship. Their mantra of what former German Green leader 
Joschka Fischer calls ‘neo-nationalism’ (Fischer, 2018) includes a very strong 
dose of Euroscepticism.
However, our analysis here does not suggest that the left across Europe 
has moved to a similar Eurosceptic position. The experience of a decade 
of crisis and the EU’s response has undoubtedly made the parties on the 
European left more critical of significant aspects of the integration process. 
This corresponds to what Leruth, Startin and Underwood have described 
as the ‘embedding’ and ‘mainstreaming’ of Euroscepticism (2017: 4), and 
indeed the term ‘critical Europeanism’ is used in their work (Bourne & 
Chatzopoulou, 2017). But left parties have clearly not followed the ‘hard’ 
Eurosceptic stance of ‘outright and unqualified opposition’ to the process 
of European integration (Taggart, 1998: 336). Instead, they have expressed 
‘soft’ Euroscepticism, a ‘contingent or qualified opposition’ (Taggart 1998: 
335) rather than outright rejection.
A number of significant new left-wing analyses emerged during the crisis. 
These include Thomas Piketty’s hugely influential re-analysis of capitalism 
(2014) and the critiques of inequality put forward by Joseph Stiglitz (2012) 
and Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett (2009). These fed into new analyses 
among left-wing parties, groups and activists, and indeed much of this 
discussion was characterised by attempts to find a broad common ground 
among ‘diverse political traditions – green, radical left, liberal’ (DiEM25, 
n.d.). Europe’s left was searching for a common understanding of the crisis 
and an agreement on common policy priorities, characterised by a critical 
but constructive interpretation of European integration. Their aim was ‘to 
repair the EU’ (DiEM25, n.d.).
DiEM25, or the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025, was set up by a 
number of politicians and activists, including notably the economist and 
former Greek Finance Minister, Yanis Varoufakis. They argue that ‘the EU 
will either be democratised or it will disintegrate’ (DiEM25, n.d.) and their 
manifesto calls for a more democratic and decentralised EU and a new 
European constitution, based on what Varoufakis terms ‘decentralised 
Europeanisation’ (Varoufakis et al., 2013: 11–12). A similar initiative was 
Plan B in Europe, which consisted of two conferences held in 2015, one in 
Paris and one in Madrid. These called for ‘a complete renegotiation of the 
European treaties’ and the need for strong involvement of civil-society 
movements in developing an alternative left trajectory for EU integration 
(Plan B in Europe, 2015). Similarly, Thomas Fazi argues that ‘the best hope 
for the citizens and workers of Europe lies in a radical reform of the EU 
and EMU, not in their rejection’ (Fazi, 2014: 164).
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From interregnum to an altered Europe
Gramsci made the well-known observation that a ‘crisis consists precisely 
in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this inter-
regnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’ (Hoare & Sperber, 
2016: 69). The economic crisis produced a moment of serious challenge and 
significant opportunity for left-wing political parties in Europe. But rather 
than seize the moment, the left has struggled to turn the crisis to its advantage. 
As Keating and McCrone note with reference to one branch of the left 
family, ‘given that capitalism itself appears to be in crisis, and the hegemony 
of neoliberalism may be coming to an end, it seems strange that social 
democracy should fail to reap the benefit’ (2015: 2). The same could equally 
be said of the green left and radical left.
This is because the two traditional approaches of the left to the EU both 
involve an awkward dilemma. The first option would be akin to renewed 
Europeanisation. The left should support the idea of the further deepening 
of the EU, by strengthening its economic governance structures. Elements 
of this can be seen in the proposals put forward by French President Emmanuel 
Macron in 2017, calling for a qualitative leap in integration (OuestFrance, 
2017). Macron had, of course, come from a left of centre background, 
having been a minister in the previous Socialist Party administration of 
François Hollande, but had left the PS to form his own En Marche! movement. 
But these ideas run the risk of simply continuing to accede to a neoliberal 
European Union and accepting a swathe of policy restrictions. This might 
have been a necessary or even an acceptable compromise before the crisis, 
but since 2008 the economic and political discourse has shifted.
The second option would be for the left to go down the Eurosceptic path, 
by rejecting the EU as a tool for European integration and the Eurozone as 
impossible to reform and propose credible alternatives that promote a detailed 
credible alternative vision of a Lexit Europe. But as Chapter 12 by Storey 
in this volume has argued, there are obstacles to this. Furthermore, Zimmer 
warns of the danger of demanding a restart of the EU as this can easily be 
understood as breaking up EU integration processes. Zimmer argues that 
this ‘would only play into the hands of right-wing nationalists as the vacuum 
created would lead to the disappearance of social and legal rights ultimately 
affecting most those weakest parts in society’ (Zimmer, 2018). If you break 
the Humpty Dumpty Union, all the left’s men would find it almost impossible 
to put it back together again in their preferred shape, particularly given the 
strength of the anti-international and anti-European forces on the right.
So we return to the third option of alter-Europeanism. This involves 
keeping the existing European Union but developing a comprehensive 
programme to alter it. The problem lies in the failure of the left to construct 
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its own narrative for a new social, political and economic balance in Europe. 
For the social democratic left, they had been relatively recent converts to 
neoliberalism, which made it harder for them to undertake another sudden 
volte-face. The green left struggled to make their environmental agenda 
heard during the crisis, while the radical left were much more focused on 
a defensive agenda, trying to protect existing structures rather than promoting 
new goals or ideals.
In the meantime, the debate is moving on. The economic crisis is very 
far from finished. The political consequences are only beginning to be felt, 
and for many the social and economic damage to their lives is still a very 
real, daily experience. But as we write in 2018, the daily headlines have 
moved on, to issues of migration and Brexit and Trump and illiberalism. 
The left therefore needs not only a convincing new agenda for the EU, it 
needs to connect this effectively to broader issues.
An alter-Europe needs to put forward a programme for three things. 
First, it needs to present an argument for a reformed, democratic political 
structure for the EU, with greater democratic governance of the euro being 
a priority. Second, it needs to set a new policy agenda for the EU, including 
not just the Eurozone and other economic policies, but also a vision for all 
the EU’s policies, including social policy, foreign policy and environmental 
policy. Third, it needs to present a strategy by which the left can gain power 
in order to implement these reforms.
The experience of the European left, across all three left party families, 
has been quite varied and ranges from electoral rise to collapse. In general, 
parties of both the radical left and the green left have remained stable or 
even increased their national shares of vote, though only by limited amounts 
in most cases. The occasional triumphs, such as that of the Dutch green 
left in 2017 and the exceptional success of newcomers such as Podemos and 
SYRIZA, should be noted in particular. But the radical left and green left 
remain confined to just a few countries, and in most of those they are no 
more than a marginal political presence.
Social democrats have had a tougher time. Several have suffered serious 
electoral defeats, notably in Greece, Spain, Ireland, Netherlands, Germany 
and France. They have held on to power in several countries, though this 
has been something of a poisoned chalice. When they attain governmental 
office, it is usually as a junior partner in a right-led coalition, meaning that 
they end up implementing austerity policies – and thus further alienating 
core supporters.
For the time being, it appears that most parties on the radical left, in line 
with parties from the more centre left green and social democratic parties, 
accept the need to work for a common left future vision of a reformed EMU 
and EU integration processes. Similarly, Busch et al. (2016: 82) argue not 
Alter-Europeanism? 229
only that the left has a major role to play in reforming an EU and a Eurozone 
that has been marred by a decade of crisis, but go even further by arguing 
that this is inevitable, as ‘the EU will only survive, if it adopts the best 
discourse for the future that allows progressive actors to push for a different 
model that is Europe based on solidarity’ (Busch et al., 2016: 82).
The crisis is far from over. Economic growth is one thing, but the social 
damage from years of austerity is much more long lasting. And the political 
fallout is also still developing. The rise of populism and identity politics 
and the resurgence of the far right represent an ongoing challenge. As we 
write in 2018, the crisis is in the daily headlines less than before. But it is 
very far from being resolved or from having played itself out. The analysis 
in this book suggests that for the left, the transformations triggered by the 
crisis are only just starting to take effect.
There is a steadily emerging conversation about reform of the EU, 
encompassing both a rebalancing of the political architecture and a refocusing 
of the policy agenda. On the political aspect, the main aim is to enhance 
the democratic legitimacy of the EU; on the policy side, the ideas focus 
strongly on a rejection of austerity and neoliberalism, and on promoting 
reform of the EMU and strengthening the social dimension of the EU. 
However, one significant problem remains. These reform discussions remain 
strongly at the elite level. In terms of appealing to voters and electorates, 
the left is still struggling to find a way of selling a vision of another Europe. 
The left might be starting to generate new ideas, but it is not yet turning 
that into the hard currency of votes.
Note
1 The term alter-mondialiste emerged in France as a positive alternative to the 
label ‘anti-globalisation’, which was often inaccurately applied to critics of 
globalisation. The contention was that these critics are not against greater 
global connections, they want stronger but better connections, in the sense of 
being more just, more fair and more equal. Thus, alter-mondialisme implies 
changing the direction of globalisation rather than being against it (see Massiah 
& Massiah, 2010).
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